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11. ARGUMENT IN REPLY 
A. ' Mr. Moore was Denied his Federal and State Constitutional Rights to a 
S ~ e e d v  Trial. 
Both Mr. Moore and the state agree as to the standard ofreview. Appellant's Opening 
Brief, p. 4; Respondent's Brief, p. 4. And, both agree that the balancing test of Bavlcev 11. Wingo, 
407 U.S. 5 14, 92 S.Ct. 2 182 (i 972), is used to determine whether the federal and state' 
constit~~tioual rights have been violated. Appellant's Opening Brief, p. 5; Respondent's Brief, p. 
5. And, there is no dispute that the Bavlcev factors are 1) the length of the delay; 2) the reason for 
the delay; 3) the defenda~it's assertion of the right to speedy trial; and 4) the prejudice occasioned 
by the delay. Barlcev v. Wiizgo, 407 U.S. at 530, 92 S.Ct at 2192; State v. Davis, 141 Idaho 838, 
835, 118 P.3d 160, 167 (Ct. App. 2005) 
Where Mr. Moore and tlie state differ is in the application of the law to the facts of this 
case. Appellant's Opening Brief, p. 5; Respondent's Brief, p. 5. But, as set out in Mr. Moore's 
Opening Brief, analysis of the Bavlcer factors in this case leads to the conclusion that there was a 
violation of the state and fedeval co~istitutio~lal rights to speedy trial. 
1. Length of Delay 
Both Mr. Moore and the state agree that the length of the delay in this case triggers 
judicial review.' Appellant's Opening Brief, p. 5; Respondent's Brief p. 5. However, there is 
one difference in the analysis of Mr. Moore and that ofthe state. The state argues that delay of 
16 months between Mr. Moore's arrest and the time he filed his motion to dismiss "is not 
excessive." Unspoken is the state's assumption that the actual delay between arrest and 
' Counsel apologizes to the Court and the state for an arithmetic error in the Opening 
Brief. There are 16 months, not 18 months, between September 2006 and January 2008. 
resolution of the inotion to dismiss for violation of speedy trial, 22 months, is also "not 
excessive." In support of its position, the state cites two cases, State v. Campbell, 104 Idaho 705, 
708, 662 P.2d 1149, 11 52 (Ct. App. 1983), and State v. Taliitage, 104 Idalio 249, 252,658 P.2d 
920, 923 (1983). Canrpbell involved a delay of 12 moilths, just over % of the delay involved in 
illis case by the time the motion to dismiss was decided, and Talnrage involved a delay of 7.5 
months, ahout 113 of the total delay involved in this case. Neither case makes any statement that 
a 22 month total delay is not excessive. Moreover, other case law does not support the state's 
co~lclusion that a delay of 16 months to nearly two years "is not excessive." To the contray, 
Stale v. Lopez, 144 Idalio 349, 353, 160 P.2d 1284, 1288 (Ct. App. 2007), held that a delay of 17 
months in a case charging three feloilies was "unreasonable" and weighed significantly against 
the state in analyzing whether there had been a constitutional violation. 
While the state may not believe that requiring a defendant to wait 22 months before his 
inotion to dismiss for violation of speedy trial is even decided and ultimately wait 2 years and 3 
months between arrest and a plea entry date, llle case law does not support that position. 
Likewise, cornillon sensibility does not support the idea that a pel-son sho~ild have to wait nearly 
2 years for a case to be resolved by entry of a plea. 
2. Reason for the Delay 
Both Mr. Moore and the state agree that, in evaluating the reasons for a delay, different 
weights are assigned to different reasons. State v. Davis, 141 Idaho at 836, 118 P.3d at 168. 
Appellant's Opening Brief, p. 6; Respondent's Brief, p. 6. However, Mr. Moore and the state 
disagree on the basic question of who is responsible for bringing a criminal defendant to trial in a 
timely fashion. 
h~ its brief, the state does not attempt to argue that it had good reason for the delay in this 
case. Rather, the state bases its argu~nent regarding the reasons for the delay around the theme 
that "Moore has failed to show that the delay was not the result of his own actions, much Less 
that it was the state that caused the delay" and on the theme that Mr. Moore has not provided a 
s~fficient appellate record and that what record he has supplied indicates an implicit voluntarq' 
waiver of speedy trial. Respondent's Brief, p. 6 - 9. 
The state's first theme is premised on the misconception that it is the defendant's 
responsibility to bring a case to trial in a timely manner. That is the opposite of the law. "The 
prosecution and the trial court have the primary burden to ensure that cases are brought to trial in 
a timely manner." State v. Lopez, 144 Ida110 at 355, 160 P.3d at 1300, citing Barlcev v. Wingo, 
407 U.S. at 529, 92 S.Ct. at 2191. The ultimate respotlsibility for co~nplying with the 
constitutio~ls of the United States and the State of Idaho in this regard rests with the stale rather 
t11m the defendant. State v. Lopez, s tpm,  citing Bnr,Icer, 407 U.S. at 53 1, 92 S.Ct. at 2 192, and 
State v. Llavis, 141 Idaho at 835, 11 8 P.3d at 169. See also, Slate v. Clavk, 135 Idaho 255, 258, 
I6 P.3d 931, 934 (2000) (the speedy trial statute mandates that the state must show good cause 
for a delay greater than six months) 
It was not Mr. Moore's dnty to demonstrate that he was not the cause of the delay in this 
case. It was the state's duty to denlonstrate, given that the case was delayed so long that there 
was a presumptive violation of the state and federal constitutions, that there were substantial 
reasons to justify the delay. State v. Hernandez, 136 Idaho 8, 11, 27 P.3d 417,420 (Ct. App. 
2001). See also, State v. Lurid 124 Ida110 290, 292, 858 P.2d 829, 831 (Ct. App. 1993). 
As discussed in Appellant's Opening Brief, the District Court found three reasons for the 
delay: 1) the state's lack of diligence in researching Mr. Moore's prior history; 2) Mr. Moor6 first 
requesting a court trial and then requesting a jury trial; and 3) the fact that the trial was scheduled 
to acco~nmodate the schedule of one of the state's witnesses. Appellant's Opening Brief, p. 7. 
Mr. Moore has argued that the first reason, lack of diligence, weighs against a finding of good 
cause. Appellant's Ope~iing Brief, p. 7. Mr. Moore has further argued that the District Court 
elred in attributing any of the delay to his initial request for a cowl trial and later request for a 
jury trial. This argume~lt has two bases. First, the case law that holds that tile speedy trial rule is 
designed to acconimodate a reasonable number of pretrial motions and the existence of those 
motions does not constitute gr0~111ds for delaying a trial. State v. Stuavt, 113 Idaho 494,745 P.2d 
1 I I5 (Ct. App. 1987). Second, a speedy trial violation occurred long before Mr. Moore changed 
his request from that for a court trial to a jury trial. His change of request one year after he 
entered a not guilty plea was not a factot. in the violatio~l, Appellant's Opening Brief, p. 7 - 8. 
And, lastly, Mr. Moore has argued, based upon State v. Davis, 141 Idaho at 837, 118 P.3d at 170, 
that the setting of the trial around the witness's schedule does not constitute a valid cause for the 
delay of a trial. Appellant's Opening Brief, 9 - 10. 
! The state has chosen not to fully address these reasons for the delay. The state does not 
j 
even mention tile second two reasons for the delay in its brief - the supposed impact of Mr. 
Moore's request for a court trial and the scheduling of the case around a witness schedule. 
i 
! Respondent's Brief, p. 6 - 9. And, with regard to the first reason, lack of diligence by the state in 
I 
researching Mr. Moore's history, the state inakes the argument that this was not a problem. 
! 
Without any explanation, the state puts forth that there is no speedy trial issue with amendments ! j 
of the charges that continue for 18 months -the first amendinent on March 1, 2007, was six 
j 
4 
months after the arrest; tile second amendment was on January 4, 2008, 16 inonths after the 
arrest, a i~d  the final information was not filed until March 24,2008, a full 18 months after the 
arrest. The state dismisses any concern that this long delay in even figuring out what to charge 
was problematic stating, "Moore is only speculating that [the delay in the proceedings] had 
something to do with the amendment. Likewise, the state filed the felony complain on January 4, 
2008. No doubt this caused some delay as it necessitated the holding or waiving of a preliminary 
hearing, but . . . there is nothing in the record to suggest tliat this delay was or would have been 
sig~~ificant." Responderlt's Brief, p. 9. While the state may not see any connection between its 
failure to fignre out liow to charge Mr. Moore for 18 moiiths and the fact tliat there was a denial 
of speedy trial, such a connection is obvious and is a violation of the federal and state 
constitutions. 
f i e  state's second theme, that Mr. Moore lias not preseiiied a sufficieiit appellate record 
and that what record he did supply indicates an ilnplicit voluntary waiver of speedy trial, is 
preiliised on a inisreading of the record and the case law. 
The state first cites a reference made by the District Court on June 12, 2008. 
The District Court stated: 
Because there is a pretrial ineinoraiiduin that's been filed in the case - I'm a little 
unclear as to Ciie date of that. I know the pretrial, accordiiig to the trial scheduling 
notice, was set for January of 2007. But it states, 'set for court trial. Offer 
extended. Possible resolution prior to trial. Order an evaluation.' Both counsel 
signed that, so it appears there was a waiver of a jury trial fi-0111 tlie pretrial - . . . 
Tr. 6/12/08, p. 4, In. 18-20. 
From this the state argues on appeal, that there are "pretrial memoranda" that are not in 
the appellate record that indicate that Mr Moore stipulated or acquiesced in setting over the July 
23, 2007, trial date for sentencing in September 2007. Respondent's Brief, p. 8 - 9. However, the 
memorandum the District Court was referring to is in the Clerk's Record at page 41. It is in fact 
undated, and slates only those words quoted by the District Court The pre-trial menloraildum, 
which was not signed by Mr. Moore, sets no trial date or sentencrng date and does not include 
any indication whatsoever of any waiver of speedy trial. Note also, despite the state's argument 
that this Court should infer from this document a waiver of Mr. Moore's right to speedy trial. 
waiver is a voluntary relinquishment or abandomnent of a lcnown right or privilege and courts 
should indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver. State v. Lopez, 144 Idaho at 352, 
160 P.3d at 1287, citing Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. at 525,92 S.Ct. at 2189. Courts "should not 
presume accjr~iescence in the loss of fundamental rights." Bnrlcer v. Wiizgo, sulmz. Waiver cannot 
be i n f e ~ ~ e d  from a docuineilt that does not set a trial date, does not include any language 
whatsoever indicating an intent to waive speedy trial, and is not signed bythe defendant. Barlcer 
v. Wingo, supra; Stale v. Lopez, supm. 
The state next refers to this statement by the District Court on June 12, 2008: 
Then, on July 23'd which was the time set for the court trial -- there is a document 
here called a 'Pretrial ~emorandum'  reflecting Boise City was there; defense 
couilsel was there through the Public Defender's Office. And it says, 'Sentencing 
set for September 121h, 2007, at 3:45 p.m.' before the judge. Albert Moore signed 
it. Charlene Davis for the Defense. . . . 
Tr. 6/12/08, p. 6, in. 19 - 25. Respondent's Brief, p. 8 -9 
While the state argues that this statement by the Court indicates a stipulation or 
acquiescence in a violatiovl of speedy trial, this is contraly to the record. The pretrial 
metnorandum cited by the District Court is at page 99 of the Clerk's Record. That mernorandu~n 
does not inc1ude a waiver of speedy trial. Per Lopez, above, waiver is not to he inferred and this 
document actually deinonstrates no more than that Mr. Moore was infonned that sentencing had 
been set for September 12,2007. It does not indicate in aiiy way tliat he agreed to that date or 
was instrumental in choosing that date. 
The state next refers to a statement in the June 12, 2008, hearing wherein the Court 
referred to a pretrial memorandum which reset the trial to February 15, 2008. Respondent's 
Brief, p. 9, citing Tr. 6/12/08, p. 8, in. 25 - p. 9, In. 15. The state claims in its brief that this 
pretrial memorandum sl~ows that Mr. Moore requested that the December 2007 trial date he 
reset. However, the pretrial rnernorandum, which is at page 102 of the Clerk's Record, states: 
"Reset PTC & JT. Defendant to make motion to dismiss. Offer conveyed." Contrary to the 
state's assertions in its brief, this document does not in aiiy way indicate that the trial dates were 
reset per Mr. Moore's request. Rather, it just states that Mr. Moore intends to inalce a motion to 
dismlss. And, again, the document does not contain any reference to any waiver of speedy trial 
rights and suc11 waiver is not to be inferred. R 102, Stale v. Lopez, szipm. 
'The state next refers to a statement in the June 12 hearing wherein the District Court said 
that Mr. Moore failed to appear for an arraiyi~nent or preliminary hearing in January 2008. 
Respondent's Brief, p. 9, citing Tr. 6/12/08, p. 10, In. 7 - p. 11, In. 25. However, the ROA does 
not reflect the doculllent cited by the District Court as ever having been in the record. Rather, the 
ROA indicates that there was an arraignment on January 23, 2008, and at that tilve trial was set 
for Fehn~aly 7, 2008. ROA p. 3. Note, however, that the Clerk's Record at page 43, states that 
there was a failure to appear on Feh~uary 4, 2008. R 43. There is no explanation in the record as 
to why the ROA and the actual docuinents in the Clerk's Record are not in agreement. However, 
there is no indicationin either place that there was a waiver of speedy trial. Slate v. Lopez, supra. 
And, lastly, the state cites the District Court's stateinent that the record shows that on 
March 6, 2008, there was a request for a set over. Tr. 6/12/08, p. 11, in. 22 - p. 12, in. 5. 
Respondent' Brief, p. 9. The state argues that this indicates that Mr. Moore either requested or 
acquiesced in setting over the preliminary hearing. Again, however, the record to which the 
District Comt referred, is in the Clerk's Record at page 49. That document, magistrate court 
minutes, does not indicate who requested the set over or whether there was an objection to it. 
Further, the minutes make absolutely no indication that Mr. Moore explicitly or even implicitly 
agreed to waive speedy trial. R 49. 
While the state is insistent that the record supplied on appeal was deficient, the materials 
the state claims were missing are in fact in the Clerk's Record. Moreover, ilolie of those 
materials denionstrate a waiver of speedy trial. 
As set out in the Opening Brief, the reasons for the delay in this case were not sufficient 
to overcome a finding that there was a violation of the state and federal constitulional rights to 
speedy trial. 
3 .  Assertioi? ojthe Right to Speedy Pin1 
As set out in Mr. Moore's Opening Brief, he asserted his right to speedy trial via a motion 
to dismiss filed 16 months after he was arrested. Elowever, even once he filed his motion to 
dismiss, he was forced to wail another six months just for a decisioil on that motion. Mr. Moore 
asserts that this delay weighs against a finding that there was no constitutional violation. 
Appellant's Opening Brief, p. 12 - 11 .' 
Mr. Moore has now been able to review the videotape of his initial arraignment. Mr. 
Moore did not waive or invoke speedy trial at that proceeding. Augmented Appellate Record. 
8 
The state argues that Mr. Moore's motion was an assertion of only the statutory right to 
speedy trial and, that at any rate, its timing indicates that, "he was seeking to talte advantage of 
delay rather than being truly interested in going to trial." Respondent's Brief, p. 10. However, 
both Mr. Moore's Brief in Support of his Motion to Dismiss aud the District Court's 
Memorandum Opinion make clear that Mr. Moore asserted both his constitutional and statutory 
rights. Exhibit on Appeal, Brief in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss; R 107 - 112. The 
state is simply wrong when it argues that Mr. Moore did not assert his constitutional rights to 
speedy trial. 
Additionally, the record does not demonstrate that Mr. Moore was not interested in going 
to trial. There is nowhere in the record where Mr. Moore states that he does not want this case 
resolved. And, to imply that from a motion to dismiss is at best a stretch and at worst a mis- 
characterization of Mr. Moore's motion. Naturally, Mr. Moore would have preferred to have his 
case dismissed, thus eliminating the need to go to trail at all. Tllat does not mean that he did not 
want a speedy trial if a trial was needed. 
Mr. Moore did assert his right to speedy trial. But, even if he had not, the onus was on 
the state and the court to bring this case to resolution within the speedy trial requirements of the 
state and federal constitutions. State 11. Lopez, 144 ldaho at 355, 160 P.3d at 1300, citing Barkcer 
v. Wingo, 407 U.S. at 529, 92 S.Ct. at 2191. 
Lastly, as set out in State 11. Dillfll-d, 110 Idaho 834, 843,718 P.2d 1272, 1281 (Ct. App. 
1986), the statutoly right to speedy trial is self-executing. The defendant does not have to assert 
his right to a speedy trial or affirmatively request a trial setting within the speedy trial period. 
In sum, Mr. Moore did assert his right to speedy trial through his motion to dismiss. 
Regardless of what the state believis might have been his secret motivations for filing a motio~l 
to dismiss, the fact remains that the state and court had a duty to bring this case to trial in a 
timely fashion. The failure to do so violated the state and federal constitutions. Moreover, even 
ifthis Court is inclined to somehow count agalnst Mr. Moore the fact that his motion to dismiss 
was not filed ul~til 16 months had passed since his ail-est, there remained a six month period of 
waiting for the District Couri to even rule on his motion to dismiss. That time of waiting alone 
weighs heavily against a finding that there was 110 speedy trial violatio~i 
4. Pvejudice 
The District Court recognized the anxiety and uncertainty suffered by Mr. Moore as a 
result of the delay in this case. R 11 1 - 112. However, the state dismisses this prejudice 
asserting that anxiety and uncertainty are inevitable in every case. From this the state goes on to 
argue that if anxiety and ~ulcertainty are the only prejudice suffered by a defendant, then the 
i factor of prejudice should weigh against a finding o fa  violation of the right to speedy trial 
! 
1 Respondent's Brief, p. 11 - 12. 
I This argument is in conflict with Doggett v. Uizited States, 505 U.S. 647, 112 S.Ct. 2686 
i 
I (1 992), and State v. Davis, szipva. Both Doggett and Dcivis recognize that anxiety and 
I uncertainty during a long delay awaiting trial are prejudicial. I11 Doggett, in fact, the case tunled 
in part upon the question of whether there can be a speedy trial violation when there is neither 
pre-trial i~lcarceration or anxiety and uncertainty because the defendant is not aware of the delay 
in bringing him to trial. And, Davis involved a case like this one wherein there was 110 claim 
made that delay had eroded a defense. Yet, Davis does not simply dismiss the question of 
prejudice as urged by the state in this case. Rather, Davis states that "the presumption of 
prejudice occasioned by the length of the delay, the ordinary nature of the case, and Davis's 
anxiety are to be balanced against the reason for the delay and Davis's assertion of her right lo a 
speedy trial." 141 Idaho at 173, 118 P.3d at 841. 
The delay in this case did cause prejudice and that prejudice should be weighed in favor 
of finding a violation of the constitutional rights to speedy trial. 
It must also be noted that the Respondent has asserted in a footnote to its argument about 
prejudice that Mr. Moore's claims on appeal should be rejected because, according to the state, 
Mr. Moore failed to provide a complete record in this Court. Respondent's Brief, p. 1 I ,  ftnt. 3. 
This assertion itself should be rejected by this Court. As set out above, tlze doc~unents the state 
claims are inissing froin the appellate record are in fact in the Clerk's Record. 
5 .  Weighing the l iac~oi~s 
In this case, there was a significant delay. The cause of the delay was the state's laclc of 
diligence in researching Mr. Moore's prior history and the fact that the trial was scheduled lo 
accommodate the calendar of one ofthe state's witnesses. Mr. Moore never waived his right to 
speedy trial and did assert that right in the fonll of a motion to dismiss. And, there was prejudice 
as Mr. Moore was forced to endure a very lengthy period of anxiety and uncertainty. The stale 
asserts that on balance, this Court should find no constitutional violation, noting "[tlhe delay was 
relatively short." Respondent's Brief, p. 12. The state nlight see a wait of nearly 2 years -in 
fact, Mr. Moore was not sentenced until January 5,2009,2 years and 5 months after he was 
arrested, as "relatively short." But, it tluly is a long period oftirne. Weighing all the Barlcer 
factors, this Court should properly find that there was a violation of the state and federal 
constitutions. 
B. The Delay in this Case also Violated the Statutorv Right to Speedy Trial 
The delay in this case violated the state and federal constitutional rights to speedy trial. It 
also violated the statutoly right to speedy trial. 
As Mr. Moore set out in the Opening Brief, there was no good cause for the delay in this 
case. Neither the state's lack of diligence in ascertaining Mr. Moore's history nor the setting of a 
trial around a state's witness's schedule constitute good cause. State v Clark, 135 Idaho 255, 
260, 16 P.3d 931, 936 (2000). And, given there was no good cause, I.C. 5 19-3501 requires 
dismissal of the case 
The state has pointed out that the Opening Brief does not specify a subsection of I.C. § 
19-3501. Mr. Moore's motion to dismiss in the District Court cited subsection 4 of the statute, 
aiid that subsection should have been cited in theOpening Brief. R 36. 
I.C. 19-3501(4) states: 
The couii, unless good cause to the contrary is shown, must order the prosecution 
or indictment to be dismissed, in the following cases: 
(4) If a defendant, charged with a misdemeanor offense, whose trial has not been 
postponed ul~on his application, is not brought to trial within six (6) months from 
the date that the defendant enters a plea of not guilty with the court. 
This section is applicable because Mr. Moore was charged with a misdemeanor and 
entered a not guilty plea on September 5, 2006. R 3, 11. By the tiine Mr. Moore filed his motion 
to dismiss, his trial was set for Febnlary 15,2008. R 4, 36. Clearly, the state had not brought 
Mr. Moore to trial within six months of his guilty plea. In fact, to meet the statutory speedy trial 
requirement, Mr. Moore would have had to have been brought to trial by March 5,2007. I.C. 5 
'The state has argued in a footnote, without citation to authority other than the statute 
itself, that because it amended the charge to a felony after the mnning of the stat~ttory speedy trial 
time limit, this Caul? should apply subsection (1) of the statute instead of subsection (4). 
Respondent's Brief, p. 13. See, TAR 35(b)(6) (respondent's argument shall contain contentions 
of respondent with citations to authorities). In a way, this argument by the state is irrelevant to 
the final resolution of this case, because there was a speedy trial violation under both subsections. 
Note that the state admits that the subsection (I) was violated, but argues that it had good cause 
for the violation. Respondent's Brief, p. 14. Ilowever, it should also be noted that there is no 
case law which would strpport the state's position that it can amend its way out of a speedy trial 
problem under subsection (4). To the extent that the state seeks a new rule as to the application 
of suhsect~ons (1) and (4), this is foreclosed by State v. McICeetlz, 136 Idaho 619, 627, 38 P.3d 
1275,1283 (Ct. App. 2001). Appellant's Opening Brief, 12 - 13 
More relevant to the resolution of this case is this: once the six month time limit has 
expired, the District Court is required to dismiss the case unless there is a showing of good cause. 
I.C. $ 19-3501. See illso, State v. Dillai,cl, sz~pra, holding that 1.C. 5 19-3501 is self-executing 
As set oat in the Opening Brief, there was not good cause to avoid disniissal of the case. 
Appellant's Opening Brief, p. 12 - 14. 
The state has argued in response: 
Ilere the delay between the arrest and the filing of the infoimation was caused by 
the state's failure to lea111 of the underlying convictions supporting the felony 
charge. (R., pp. 110-1 1 (delay caused by "prosecution's delayed research into the 
defendant's liistory of DUIs.")[)]. Once the state did ltnow of the prior 
convictions it amended the conlplaint and sought to file the information. (Id.) The 
fact that the state learned llzal the DUI in questioiz was a felony more than six 
inonths after Moore's' (sic) arvest, vegardless ofthe reason for when the state so 
leavnecl, is good causefor izoljiling an infovmalion within siw months o f  the 
arrest. . . 
Respondent's Briel; p. 14 (emnpliasis added). 
And, that is the state's argument. There is no citation to authority for this proposition nor 
even any explanation given for it, logical or othe~wise. And, in fact, there is no citation to 
authority, because, at least so far as Appellant can find, there has never been a case that has held 
that the state may be as dilatory as it wishes in determining whether to amend a charge from a 
misdemeanor to a felo~ly without violating tlie statutory right to speedy trial. And, in fact, there 
is 110 logical explanation, at least that Appellant can identify, that would allow the state to arrest 
solneoiie a id  then fail to investigate the case so as to allow filing of an iizfo~~natio~i within the . 
statutory speedy trial provision. To adopt the state's position would be to conlpletely negate 
subsectio~i (1) ofthe statute. 
In the District Court, Mr. Moore argued for dismissal under I.C. 19-3501 (4). And, the 
state has argued here that subsection (1) is applicable. Regardless of which subsection is applied, 
as the state itsclfadmits, the case was suhject lo dis~nissal under I.C. 5 19-3501 in the absence of 
a showing of good cause to avoid the statutory time limits.' And, as there was no good cause, the 
case should have bee11 dismissed by the District Court. 
111. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth in the Opening Brief and above, Mr. Moore requests that this 
Court find that the District Gout erred in denying his motion to dismiss for constitutional and 
statutory speedy trial violations. 
Mr. Moore also requests, for the reasons set hr th  in case No. 35486, that if relief is 
granted i11 that case, this case also be renianded for further proeeediilgs as ~ntended by the District 
Court. 
Respectf~~lly submitted this - IF day of November, 2009. 
&LL%C 
Deborah Whipple 
Attorneys f o r l b e r t  Moore 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
& 
I hereby certify that on this L?day of ~ovember,  2009,I deposited in the United States 
mail, two tiue and correct copies of the foregoing, postage prepaid addressed to: 
Kenneth Jorgenseii 
Deputy Attoilley Gcileral 
Office of the Attorney Gcneral 
P.O. Box 83720 
Bolse, LD 83720-0010 
~-&,- Dennis Beujamin 
